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PATENT INSURANCE: TOWARDS A MORE AFFORDABLE, MANDATORY SCHEME? 
 
 
J. Rodrigo Fuentes1 
 
Even though businesses insure against myriad risks, patent 
litigation is often excluded from their general commercial liability 
insurance policy.  Companies understand that patent litigation is an 
expensive ordeal, and some opt for specialized patent insurance.  
However, most businesses do not carry such protection because it is too 
costly.  This is unfortunate because some studies suggest that patent 
insurance fosters research and development among small-to-medium sized 
enterprises.  Following this finding, the European Commission called on 
CJA Consultants to study the feasibility of a mandatory, EU-wide patent 
insurance scheme in early 2003.  In 2006, CJA Consultants concluded that 
such a scheme was feasible.   
This Note analyzes the mandatory patent insurance scheme 
proposed by CJA Consultants and considers whether a similar scheme 
could be implemented in the United States.  First, the Note provides a 
background on patent insurance.  Then, actual policy specimens from a 
patent insurer are analyzed to explain the differing types of insurance, 
their costs, and their shortcomings.  Ultimately, the CJA Consultants‘ 
proposal is analyzed and compared to the identified shortcomings.  The 
Note concludes that a mandatory U.S. patent insurance scheme would fail. 
                                                             
1 Columbia Law School, J.D. expected 2009.  I am grateful to Professors Harold Edgar and 
Ronald Mann of Columbia Law School for their comments and edits to this Note.  I also owe 
thanks to the supportive staff of the Columbia Science and Technology Law Review.  Finally, I 
thank my wife, Melanie, who helped edit this Note and endured countless readings aloud.  





The United States is becoming an information economy.  Intangible assets like 
patents represent a leading asset class that leads to wealth creation. 2   Accordingly, 
―corporate leaders are beginning to recognize the value of their intangible assets.‖3  But 
these leaders also recognize that some of these crown jewels can disappear with the drop 
of a gavel.  Patents are subject to legal actions which can eliminate or diminish their 
value.4  Companies whose primary value comes from patents are exposed to daunting 
litigation risks.  While there are a variety of ways to manage patent litigation risk, 5 this 
Note focuses on insurance. 
Generally, insurance offsets the risk that a future event with potentially 
catastrophic damages may occur by presently paying a premium worth a fraction of those 
damages. 6   For example, many homeowners insure their homes against earthquakes.  
Similarly, businesses can protect themselves against infringing a patent, while patentees 
can insure the litigation expense needed to enforce their rights.  High litigation costs and 
ambiguous patent rights stimulate demand for patent insurance. 7   Unsurprisingly, 
insurance companies provide coverage for these types of risks.8   
                                                             
2 See Stephen Bennett, The IP Asset Class: Protecting and Unlocking Inherent Value, 5 J. 
Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 401, 402 (2006) (―The task force concluded intangible inputs are as 
important, or more important, to wealth creation than tangible assets.‖).  
3 Id. at 402. 
4 Consider, for example, a court‘s finding of invalidity; or a claim construction which narrows 
the scope of a patent. 
5 See Melvin Simensky & Eric C. Osterberg, The Insurance and Management of Intellectual 
Property Risks, 17 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 321, 322 (1999) (indicating that an internal 
compliance program is another alternative).  
6 See Rory A. Goode, Self-Insurance as Insurance in Liability Policy "Other Insurance” 
Provisions, 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1245, 1252 (1999) (explaining that the traditional insurance 
model is a device to transfer risks).  
7 See Alan Ratliff, Damages, Presentation at AIPLA 2007 Annual Meeting at 4 (Oct. 18, 
2007), available at 
http://www.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/Speaker_Papers/Annual_Meeting_Speaker_Papers/
200717/Ratliff-paper.pdf (―According to the AIPLA, the cost of large case patent litigation 
through trial has increased steadily from over $3 to about $5 million per party . . . .‖); Posting of 
David Schwartz, Claim Construction Reversal Rates I – Overall Reversal Rates, to Patently-O 
Patent Law Blog, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/02/claim-construct.html (Feb. 27, 2008, 
11:00 EST) (tabulating claim construction reversal rates as high as 43.5%).  
8 See Jason A. Reyes, Note, Patents and Insurance: Who Will Pay for Infringement?, 1 B.U. J. 
Sci. & Tech. L. 3, ¶ 7 (1995) (discussing the inclusion of patent insurance under the terms 
―piracy‖ and ―unfair competition‖ in commercial general liability insurance). 
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There are two types of patent insurance.  Patent litigation insurance, or defensive 
insurance, covers the litigation expenses incurred defending against allegations of patent 
infringement.  Patent enforcement insurance, or offensive insurance, reimburses patentees 
for litigation expenses arising from the pursuit of an infringer. 
Patent insurance is desirable to promote innovation among small-to-medium-sized 
enterprises (―SMEs‖).  According to Lanjouw and Schankerman, SMEs have higher 
patent litigation exposure per patent.9  Because they rarely have the resources to enforce 
their rights, SMEs tend to avoid patenting their innovations.10  Therefore, ―the system is 
skewed against SMEs.‖ 11   Research indicates that this has a detrimental effect on a 
country‘s economy and knowledge base. 12  Lanjouw and Schankerman suggest using 
affordable patent insurance to redress the imbalance without interfering with the 
incentive to innovate.13  This view is in line with various commentators who believe that 
patent insurance is a valuable method to protect SMEs and foster research and 
development.14  However, 
 
[b]ecause of the steep cost of patent insurance, many large and 
small businesses choose to go without any coverage despite the daunting 
exposures.  Until the insurance industry is able to offer its insureds 
affordable patent coverage, while at the same time controlling its own 
                                                             
9 See Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are 
Small Firms Handicapped?, 47 J.L. & Econ. 45, 63 (2004) (providing empirical data suggesting 
that a smaller patent portfolio increases the risk of being involved in a suit on any individual 
patent). 
10 See Jeff A. Ronspies, Does David Need a New Sling? Small Entities Face a Costly Barrier 
To Patent Protection, 4 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 184, 211 (2004) (―But the ability of the 
small-entity inventor to obtain and enforce patent rights is becoming an increasingly difficult 
financial burden to bear. The extreme cost of protecting a patent through litigation may result in 
fewer patents filed by small entities and thus less innovation.‖).  
11 Michael Edwards & Assoc., Scoping Study: Report of the Patent Enforcement Project 
Working Group 17 (2004), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/enforcementfinalreport.pdf.  
12 See Mette Gørtz & Merete Konnerup, Welfare Effects of a Patent Insurance – 
Microeconomic Evaluation and Macroeconomic Consequences 5 (June 2001), 
http://www.ecomod.net/conferences/ecomod2001/papers_web/ 
konnerup_Welfare%20Effects%20of%20a%20Patent%20Insurance.pdf (arguing that lower 
litigation costs will lead to gains in Denmark‘s economy and knowledge base). 
13See Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 9, at 68-69. 
14 See, e.g., Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 9, at 68-69; Ronspies, supra note 10, at 209; 
Gørtz & Konnerup, supra note 12, at 5. 
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risks, high-technology companies will continue to suffer severe financial 
set-backs or possible dissolution from increasing patent litigation. 15  
 
To date, patent insurance remains largely unpopular16 despite interest from SMEs.17 
According to CJA Consultants, Ltd., (―CJA Consultants‖) author of ―Patent 
Litigation Insurance: A Study for the European Commission on the Feasibility of 
Possible Insurance Schemes Against Patent Litigation Risks,‖18 a sufficiently widespread 
insurance scheme leads to lower costs. 19   Thus, success could be found through a 
mandatory patent insurance scheme since it would provide a sufficiently large customer 
base so that insurers could lower the premiums to an attractive amount. Such a mandatory 
scheme must: (1) meet the needs of patentees; (2) achieve technical progress in the EU; 
and (3) attract insurers to offer the patent litigation insurance. 20   In 2006, CJA 
Consultants concluded that such a scheme was feasible in the European Union (EU). 21  
The question remains — can a similar scheme be successfully adopted in the United 
States? 
Part II of this Note begins with a background on patent insurance.  The remainder 
of Part II describes two types of patent insurance and their cost.  Part III analyzes the 
failures of these insurance schemes.  Part IV analyzes the mandatory patent insurance 
                                                             
15 Lisa A. Small, Offensive and Defensive Insurance Coverage for Patent Infringement 
Litigation: Who Will Pay?, 16 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 707, 745 (1998) (citations omitted).  
16 Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 9, at 68 (asserting that patent insurance, though 
available, is underdeveloped); M. Qaiser & P. Mohan Chandran, Patent Insurance: Teflon 
Coating on Armour?, Boloji.com, Feb. 26, 2006, 
http://www.intelproplaw.com/Articles/files/Patent%20Insurance.pdf [hereinafter Qaiser I] 
(―Though it is neither well known, nor wide ly subscribed, patent insurance has been around for 
almost a decade on the international scene.‖).  
17 CJA Consultants Ltd, Patent Litigation Insurance: A Study for the European Commission 
on Possible Insurance Schemes Against Patent Litigation Risks 10 (2003), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market /indprop/docs/patent/studies/litigation_en.pdf [hereinafter 
European Study 2003] (concluding that European SMEs desired patent insurance).  This Note 
assumes that U.S. SMEs are similarly averse to patent litigation and would desire a risk spreading 
device. 
18 CJA Consultants Ltd, Patent Litigation Insurance: A Study for the European Commission 
on the Feasibility of Possible Insurance Schemes Against Patent Litigation Risks Final Report 
(2006) available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/studies/litigation_en.pdf [hereinafter 
European Study 2006]. 
19 Id at 37. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 45-52. 
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scheme proposed by CJA Consultants and considers whether that scheme can be 
implemented in the United States.  Part V concludes this Note and suggests some 





Three types of insurance have covered patent litigation.   This Note focuses on 
two: patent litigation insurance and patent enforcement insurance.22   
 
 
A.  Patent Litigation Insurance 
 
Patent litigation insurance has been developed to cover alleged infringers. 23  
Unlike commercial general liability (―CGL‖) insurance, there are only a few providers in 
this nascent field. 24   This Note focuses on Intellectual Property Insurance Services 
Company (―IPISC‖) because it provided robust information on its policies. 
                                                             
22 The third type of insurance covering patent litigation is commercial general liability (CGL) 
insurance. As businesses transitioned to an information economy, they sought coverage for patent 
infringement under their existing CGL policies. Reyes, supra note 8, ¶ 7.  But this type of 
insurance is not discussed here, because it is practically dead.  See Jason A. Reyes, Column, CGL 
Insurance Coverage for Patent Infringement, 2 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 14, ¶ 21 (1996) (―One is 
tempted to draw a conclusion that CGL coverage for patent infringement is nearly uniformly 
dead.‖).  Further, the courts have distinguished and narrowed case law in the few jurisdictions 
that applied CGL insurance to patent infringement.  See, e.g., U.S. Test, Inc. v. N D E Envtl. 
Corp., 196 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (distinguishing Rymal v. Woodcock, 896 F. Supp 
637 (W.D.La. 1995)); Heil Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 937 F. Supp. 1355, 1364 
(E.D. Wis. 1996) (distinguishing Union Ins. Co. v. Land and Sky, Inc., 529 N.W.2d 773); Mez 
Indus. v. Pac. Nat’l Ins. Co., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (distinguishing 
Union Ins. Co. v. Land and Sky, Inc., 529 N.W.2d 773 (Neb. 1995)); Konami, Inc. v. Hartford 
Ins. Co.,  761 N.E.2d 1277, 1283-84 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (distinguishing Union Ins. Co. v. Land 
and Sky, Inc., 529 N.W.2d 773). 
23 Robert M. Roach Jr. & Daniel L. McKay, Technology Risks and Liabilities: Are You 
Covered?, 54 SMU L. Rev. 2009, 2045-46 (2001).  
24 M. Qaiser & P. Mohan Chandran, Patent Insurance: An Inside View, Domain-B, Apr. 15, 
2006, http://www.domainb.com/finance/insurance/2006/20060415_inside.html [hereinafter 
Qaiser II] (listing American International Specialty Lines Insurance Company, Evanston 
Insurance Company, Aon, Indian Harbor, Lexington, Reliance, Nutmeg, and Chubb).   
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To seek business, IPISC specifies that ―median litigation costs for an infringement 
suit [amount] to $5,500,000 for patents in the U.S. as a whole.‖25  IPISC‘s marketing 
materials highlight several benefits the insurance offers.  For example:  
 
1) It enables you to mitigate the risk of unexpected infringement 
litigation; 
2) It relieves the pressure to settle a winning suit because of lack of 
financial resources; and 
3) It will discourage frivolous infringement suits and prevent loss of 
market share by demonstrating your ability to financially protect 
your business practices . . . .26 
 






IPISC‘s patent defense insurance provides coverage for ―Litigation Expense‖ 27 
incurred in defending a ―Covered Litigation.‖ 28  The insured can choose from as little as 
$100,000 to $5,000,000 in coverage. 29   This money can be used for expenses like 
attorneys‘ fees, expert witnesses, raising a defense of invalidity, and reexamination 
                                                             
25 IPISC, Features of Intellectual Property (IP) Defense Cost and (Optional) Damages 
Reimbursement Insurance 1 (2007), available at http://www.ipisc.com/downloads/Defense-
FAQ.pdf [hereinafter Defense FAQ]. 
26 Id. at 1-2. 
27 Throughout this Note, contract defined terms, printed in all caps in the original documents, 
have been changed to title-case type to enhance readability.  
28 IPISC, Infringement Defense Cost and Damages Reimbursement Insurance Policy 1 (2005) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter Defense Policy Specimen].  For a lawsuit to be ―Covered 
Litigation,‖ it must: (1) be brought during the policy period; (2) be reported to the insurer within 
the policy period; (3) name the insured as an infringer; (4) correspond to an item listed on the 
Declarations Page; and (5) the insurer has acknowledged in writing that the ―Litigation Expense‖ 
will be covered.  Id. at 6. 
29 Defense FAQ, supra note 25, at 2. ―Claim‖ is a defined term in the policy specimen that 
refers to a prepared form notifying IPISC that the insured has been sued, where said prepared 
form has been approved for coverage by IPISC through written acknowledgement.  See Defense 
Policy Specimen, supra note 28, at 4.  Additionally, ―[d]amages of up to $1 billion can be 
covered by insurance, but $20 to $30 million policies are most common.‖  Qaiser II, supra note 
24. 
Vol. X The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review  2009 
 
273 
proceedings.30  The policy limits coverage, however, to ―Covered Litigation‖ brought 
during the policy period in the United States, its territories or possessions.31  Note that 
greater coverage can be obtained—known as obtaining an endorsement—for an 
additional fee.32  IPISC does this on a case-by-case basis.   
A typical endorsement adds indemnity against damages. 33   According to the 
policy, IPISC will reimburse an insured for money paid to ―a claimant pursuant to either 
judgments, awards or settlements negotiated with the written consent of [IPISC], . . . as 
lost profits and/or royalties for past infringement, and/or reasonable attorneys‘ fees 
assessed by the Court . . . .‖ 34   Notably, ―Litigation Expense‖ consumes the 
reimbursement limit.  Thus, IPISC indemnifies damages up to the difference between the 
obtained coverage and the ―Litigation Expense.‖ 35   For example, assume Inventor 
obtained coverage for $1,000,000 and his litigation expenses totaled $800,000.  If a court 
found that Inventor owed $500,000 in lost profits, then IPISC will only cover $200,000 in 
damages.  Inventor must pay the remaining $300,000.  
Besides optional damages, IPISC further limits its coverage to disclaim unwanted 
risks.  First, the term ―Covered Litigation‖ has three significant exceptions: (1) it 
excludes counterclaims;36 (2) it excludes suits commenced a year after a claim is made 
that arise out of interrelated acts which are the basis of the claim;37 and (3) it requires 
authorization for appeals unless the insured was the prevailing party ―and the opposing 
party appeals such decision.‖ 38   Second, the policy sets a pro-rata framework for 
                                                             
30 Defense Policy Specimen, supra note 28, at 6.  
31 Id. at 2. 
32 For example, an insured may obtain an endorsement for foreign or increased coverage. 
Gotham Ins. Co., Endorsement No.: IPI 843-04 (1999) (on file with author).   
33Defense Policy Specimen, supra note 28, at 2 (―[T]he Company shall reimburse the Named 
Insured only for Litigation Expense and Damages (if Damages are designated on the Declarations 
Page) . . . .‖).  
34 Id. at 5. 
35 Id. at 2.  
36 Id. at 5. But the policy allows ―asserting any Invalidity Counterclaim or init iating any Re-
Examination Proceeding which is a direct consequence of Covered Litigation.‖  Id. at 6.   
37 Imagine that an insured makes a claim in 2008 based on activities that infringe patent ‗111.  
Those same activities also infringe the ‗222 patent.  IPISC will not cover an infringement suit for 
the ‗222 patent if the second claim is filed in 2009.  
38 Defense Policy Specimen, supra note 28, at 5. 
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allocating reimbursement if the lawsuit involves a mix of covered and uncovered 
claims.39  For example:  
 
If the Civil Proceeding includes counts or causes of action 
(―Count(s)‖) which are not Covered Litigation, reimbursable Litigation 
Expenses shall be determined by multiplying the reasonable and 
customary attorney‘s fees, costs and disbursements arising from the Civil 
Proceeding by a fraction whose numerator is the number of Counts which 
are Covered Litigation present in the suit at the time those costs arose, and 
whose denominator is the total number of Counts in the Civil Proceeding 
at that time.40 
 
Third, the insurer stands to recoup the litigation expenses if there are ―recovered costs‖ 
arising from the litigation, including costs, or attorneys‘ fees.41 
These limitations barely scratch the surface.  IPISC explicitly excludes twenty-
three other situations.42  The list below is not comprehensive, but it gives a sense of the 
exclusions.  Costs arising from the following are excluded from reimbursement: (1) 
―fines, or penalties, including but not limited to punitive, exemplary, treble, or multiple 
damages of any kind‖; (2) willful infringement; (3) ―anti-trust or anti-competitive 
conduct‖; (4) declaratory judgment actions initiated by the insured; (5) International 
Trade Commission proceedings, except reexaminations; and (6) any claim made by any 
―Named Insured‖ under this policy against any other ―Named Insured‖ under this policy.  
43  Assuming these and other exclusions do not apply, the insured must submit a claim to 
IPISC to obtain reimbursement. 
The claims process begins when the Named Insured submits an ―Infringement 
Defense Claim‖ report to IPISC.44  This report must provide ―the nature of the action,‖ 
including the allegedly infringed patents, ―an explanation of how and when the alleged 
Infringing acts occurred,‖ and ―a projection quantifying the negative impact to the 
Named Insured‖ if the plaintiff prevails.45  After the report, the Named Insured must 
provide several documents ―no later than sixty (60) days from the date of the initial 
                                                             
39 Id. at 2.  For example, a lawsuit may allege patent infringement and tortious wrongdoing.  
40 Id.  
41 Id. at 17.  
42 Id. at 9-12.  
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 12.  
45 Id.  
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request for authorization,‖ like a ―Favorable Infringement Opinion‖ 46  and a budget 
projection for the litigation.47  IPISC then authorizes or denies the claim for coverage – 
subject to more restrictions, of course. 
Before authorizing a defense, the insurer may restrict control of the litigation.  For 
example, IPISC may deny authorization because it disapproves of the Named Insured‘s 
counsel or proposed budget. 48   But disapproval is not fatal to a claim for coverage 
because the rejections may be submitted to binding arbitration. 49   Moreover, IPISC 
requires written authorization before settling the litigation. 50  And if the Named Insured 
refuses to settle ―within the policy limits recommended by [IPISC] and acceptable to the 
claimant,‖ then IPISC may withdraw from the defense. 51  In this event, the insurer‘s 
liability  
 
shall not exceed the smaller of (i) the then remaining applicable limit of 
indemnity, or (ii) the amount for which the Covered Litigation could have 
been settled if such recommendation had been consented to, plus 
Litigation Expenses incurred by [IPISC], and Litigation Expenses incurred 
by the Named Insured prior to the date of such refusal.52 
 
In sum, IPISC offers defensive insurance to take on typical patent lawsuits.  The 





Annual premiums ―usually range between 2 to 5 per cent of the insured amount.  
The average premium ranges between $24,250 and $60,625 per annum, with the 
                                                             
46 Id. at 13.  ―Favorable Infringement Opinion‖ is defined in the policy as ―an opinion by an 
intellectual property attorney . . . which opines that more likely than not a properly advised trier 
of fact or law or both would conclude that there is no Infringement of any unexpired U.S. patent . 
. . vis-à-vis a Manufactured Product . . . .‖  Id. at 6.  Note that the insurer does not cover the cost 
of obtaining an infringement opinion. Id. 
47Id. at 13-14. These are only two of eight items that the Named Insured must provide.  
48 Id. at 14.   
49 Id.  
50 Id. at 15.  
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 16. 
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minimum premium at $20,000.‖53  While estimates may be given, IPISC gives premiums 
quotes ―only after [an] application has been submitted for insurance.‖ 54  This is largely 
because the yearly fee ―depends upon many factors.‖55  For example, the premium can 




Furthermore, applicants may choose to lower the premium by opting for higher 
coinsurance or deductible.57   
The coinsurance and deductible are shared defense costs which must be paid 
before reimbursement begins.  The basic policy uses a coinsurance of 10%; 58 this is the 
percentage of litigation expenses that the insured must pay.  To illustrate, imagine that 
Inventor obtains $5,000,000 in coverage.  If his litigation costs $6M, then he must pay 
$500,000 in coinsurance plus the remaining uncovered amount.  In addition to 
coinsurance, the Named Insured must pay a deductible, or ―Self Insured Retention.‖  The 
deductible is ―the amount of unreimbursable  . . . for each Claim that the Named Insured 
shall be obligated to pay before [IPISC] shall reimburse any Claim amounts.‖ 59  The 
                                                             
53 Qaiser II, supra note 24. 
54 Defense FAQ, supra note 25, at 2. 
55 Id.   
56 See IPISC, Sample Premiums by Industry, http://www.ipisc.com/products/insurance-
policies/sample-premiums-by-industry/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2009). 
57 See Qaiser I, supra note 16, at 3 (discussing lower premiums with higher coinsurance of 
25%).   
58 See IPISC, Defense Cost Reimbursement Insurance Program Summary 1 (2007), available 
at http://www.ipisc.com/downloads/Defense-Policy-Summary.pdf [hereinafter Defense Program 
Summary]. 
59 Defense Policy Specimen, supra note 28, at 8.  
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minimum starts at 2% of the policy limit, and higher options are available.60  Assuming 
$5,000,000 in coverage, Inventor must pay a $100,000 deductible before he is 
reimbursed.  Finally, the coinsurance and deductible are negotiable and can have a 
significant impact on the premium. 61    
In sum, premiums can vary depending on many factors, like the industry in which 
the insured practices, the coinsurance payment, and the deductible.  And this is just for 
the basic policy.  Additional endorsements modify the insurer‘s exposure, which in turn 
modify the premiums.  According to IPISC, its average premium for a defense policy 
with damages indemnity was $30,000 in 2007.62    
 
 
B. Patent Enforcement Insurance 
 
IPISC also offers patent enforcement insurance, otherwise known as offensive 
insurance.  Here, the insurer pays ―for the legal fees of prosecuting patent enforcement 
litigation.‖63  It is well known that small companies face difficulties enforcing their patent 
rights due to low resources.64  Not surprisingly, IPISC markets enforcement insurance to 
SMEs, claiming it is useful:  
 
1) To strengthen the owners negotiation position and licensability of 
intellectual properties;  
2) To provide enough funds to support a strong legal front, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of a favorable outcome; [and] 
3) To make funds available when necessary, rather than utilize 
operating capital or attempt financing; . . . .65 
1. Coverage 
                                                             
60 See Defense Program Summary, supra note 58, at 1. 
61 See Qaiser II, supra note 24, at 4 (classifying premiums based on varying coinsurance, 
―[t]he minimum premiums at IPSIC range from $2,500 for $250,000 [in coverage] (75:25 co-
payment) to $7,500 for $1,000,000 [in coverage] (75:25 co-payment)‖). 
62 See Defense FAQ, supra note 24, at 2; Interview with Bruce Birkenfeld, Account 
Representative, Intellectual Prop. Ins. Servs. Corp., in Louisville, Ky. (Apr. 11, 2008) (stating 
that the majority of premiums listed on their website included damages indemnity).  
63 Reyes, supra note 8, ¶ 36.  
64 See id. ¶ 35 (―Unfortunately for small companies and individual inventors, enforcing a 
patent—especially against a well-funded infringer—is a very expensive and time-consuming 
proposition.‖ (citations omitted)); Ronspies, supra note 10, at 209. 
65 IPISC, IP Abatement Insurance: Enabling Market Share, 
http://www.ipisc.com/products/insurance-policies/abatement/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2008) 
[hereinafter Enabling Market Share]. 




IPISC‘s enforcement policy offers coverage from $100,000 to $5,000,000. 66  The 
insurer indemnifies the Named Insured 67  for litigation expense incurred (1) to stop 
infringement, (2) to defend an invalidity counterclaim, and (3) to defend a declaratory 
judgment.68  Endorsements can extend coverage to seek reissue of an infringed patent and 
to defend against a reexamination proceeding. 69  Reimbursable costs arising from the 
foregoing actions include attorneys‘ fees, court costs, depositions, and expert witnesses‘ 
fees.70  Like infringement insurance, coverage is limited to claims made during the policy 
period and within United States, its territories or possessions.71   
The enforcement policy uses a pro rata framework to avoid paying extraneous 
fees.72  The framework boils down to multiplying the following fractions by the total 
litigation expense: (1) the insured patents divided by the total number patents in the suit; 
(2) the number of counts alleging infringement divided by the total number of counts; and 
(3) the number of defendants charged with infringement divided by the total number of 
defendants.73   
Preventing exposure to preexisting infringements is another important limitation.  
IPISC shall automatically revoke a previously granted authorization if it discovers that 
any party actually began infringing before the policy period.  In this event, ―the Named 
Insured shall return all Litigation Expense paid . . . .‖  74  But if the predating infringement 
is discovered while seeking authorization, then IPISC may reject the claim against 
                                                             
66 See IPISC, Intellectual Property Infringement Abatement Insurance Program Summary 1, 
available at http://www.ipisc.com/downloads/Abatement-Policy-Summary.pdf [hereinafter 
Abatement Program Summary]. 
67 ―Named Insured‖ is a term defined in the policy.  Basically, any individual, partnership, 
joint venture, or corporation is a ―Named Insured‖ to the extent that the individual(s) or entity 
―is/are the Owner or Exclusive Licensee or has an insurable interest by way of contractual 
obligation to enforce the Insured Intellectual Property.‖  IPISC, Intellectual Property 
Infringement Abatement Insurance Policy Specimen 3 (2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Abatement Policy Specimen]. 
68 Id. at 2. 
69 Gotham Insurance Co., Endorsement No.: IPI 843-02 (1999) (on file with author).  Note that 
Gotham Insurance Co. is IPISC‘s policy carrier, and IPISC tendered this sample endorsement on 
request.  
70 Abatement Policy Specimen, supra note 67, at 7. 
71 Id. at 2.  
72 Id. at 7. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 5. 
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specific parties, like the infringing party, its subsidiaries, and its licensees or licensors.75  
Fundamentally, IPISC will not pay for infringement existing before the insured bought 
the policy.  This is a way of addressing the ubiquitous adverse selection problem insurers 
face. 
IPISC mitigates abuse by designing coverage to indemnify losses only.  For 
example, the ―Economic Benefit Provision‖ lessens the incentive to use litigation as a 
―speculative opportunity to provide the insured with a profit.‖76  ―In the event that any 
Authorized Litigation results in the Named Insured receiving an Economic Benefit, such 
recovery shall be shared between [IPISC] and the Named Insured pro rata in proportion 
to their respective contributions to Litigation Expense . . . .‖77  For example, monetary 
settlements are always shared, with IPISC receiving no more ―than 1.25 times the amount 
expended by [IPISC] in Litigation Expense.‖ 78  The Named Insured keeps the remaining 
balance of the ―Economic Benefit.‖79  But if the ―Economic Benefit‖ is not objectively 
measureable, such as an injunction, then the ―Economic Benefit shall be presumed to be 
1.25 times the amount expended by [IPISC] in Litigation Expense.‖80   
Winning an injunction, or some other intangible benefit, can result in an odd 
situation where the insured pays an injunction bonus to IPISC.81  For example, assume 
that (1) the ―Litigation Expense‖ reached the coverage limit of $1,000,000, (2) IPISC 
paid $800,000 after coinsurance, (3) the Named Insured paid $200,000 after coinsurance, 
and (4) the ―Economic Benefit‖ was an injunction.  Under these facts, the injunction is 
valued automatically at $1,000,000 – or 1.25 times the amount IPISC contributed to the 
litigation.  According to the policy, this ―Economic Benefit‖ of $1,000,000 must be 
shared pro rata between IPISC and the Named Insured.  Consequently, the Named 
Insured must give IPISC $800,000.  But where does it get this money?  Even though the 
Named Insured benefits from increased market share, the money may not be available 
immediately.   
                                                             
75 Id. 
76 Enabling Market Share, supra note 65.  
77 Abatement Policy Specimen, supra note 67, at 12. 
78 Id.  
79 Id. at 13. 
80 Id.  
81 Id. at 12 (―If there is an injunction, court order, or settlement agreement prohibiting the 
accused infringer from continuing the infringement or a settlement including cross-licensing, then 
there is Economic Benefit.  Since the amount of such benefit is difficult or impossible to 
ascertain, the Economic Benefit shall be presumed to be 1.25 times the amount expended by the 
Company in Litigation Expense.‖) (emphasis added).  
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Because state champerty laws ban recovery sharing, 82 the ―Economic Benefit‖ 
provision seems troublesome.  But the enforcement policy ensures that IPISC never 
recovers more money than the contracted coverage amount.83  To demonstrate, assume 
that (1) the ―Litigation Expense‖ reached the coverage limit of $1,000,000; (2) the case 
settled for $3,000,000; (3) IPISC paid $800,000 after coinsurance; and (4) Named 
Insured paid $200,000 after coinsurance.  Because IPISC can never collect more than 
1.25 times the amount it contributed to ―Litigation Expense,‖ it will receive $800,000 
times 1.25, a total of $1,000,000.  More importantly, any money IPISC receives ―shall go 
to reinstate the policy limits by the amount received . . . .‖84  Thus, the ―Economic 
Benefit‖ provision may ultimately benefit the insured. 
IPISC‘s enforcement insurance also excludes coverage under a variety of 
circumstances.  For example, costs arising from the following are excluded from 
reimbursement: (1) salaries or expenses for officers, employees, and in-house attorneys; 
(2) ―willful acts of the Named Insured giving rise to Infringement‖ of the insured patents; 
(3) infringement when Named Insured knew or had reason to suspect a third party was 
infringing before the policy began; (4) declaratory judgment actions initiated by the 
insured; (5) Administrative Proceedings, including the ITC; (6) anti-trust litigation; and 
(7) infringement by a licensee who, because of an ―Act of Breach,‖ is no longer 
licensed.85 
The claims process is very similar to the defense policy discussed above.  Mainly, 
the insurer must authorize litigation before reimbursement begins.  IPISC considers 
authorization when the insured submits a claim, which states the ―nature of the proposed 
action and the expected result; an explanation of how and when the Infringement was 
first discovered; . . . when the Infringement first began irrespective of when [it] was 
discovered; and a project quantifying the negative impact to the Named Insured . . . .‖86  
Within sixty days of submitting a claim, the insured must submit nine other supporting 
documents. 87  Primarily, the insured must obtain an opinion from independent patent 
counsel that highlights the validity of the insured patent and the infringement thereof.88  
                                                             
82 Reyes, supra note 8, ¶ 44 (―Recovery sharing between the patent holder and IPISC faces 
difficulties in some states due to champerty laws, which ban the sharing of damage awards with 
third parties.‖).  Champerty is defined as ―an agreement between a stranger to a lawsuit and a 
litigant by which the stranger pursues the litigant‘s claim as consideration for receiving part of 
any judgment proceeds.‖ Black's Law Dictionary 224 (7th ed. 1999). 
83 See Abatement Policy Specimen, supra note 67, at 12.     
84 Id. at 13. 
85 Id. at 15-17. 
86 Id. at 9.  
87 Id. at 9-10. 
88 Id. 
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Other documents require the insured to provide a budget projection, preference of 
litigation counsel, and the manner in which markings 89  were applied to the patent. 90  
Failure to provide these, or other enumerated documents, results in the forfeiture of a 
claim.91   
There are also significant controls on the litigation.  For example, the insured‘s 
chosen litigation counsel is subject to IPISC‘s approval. 92    The same goes for the 
litigation budget.93  Coverage for an appeal must be approved if the ―Named Insured does 
not prevail in the Authorized Litigation . . . .‖94  But if the Named Insured prevails95 and 
the infringer appeals, then IPISC must authorize coverage for the appeal.96  Remarkably, 
the enforcement policy does not contain a settlement provision.97   
The basic enforcement policy can be upgraded through endorsements.  For 
instance, an insured can obtain ―increased policy limits from a previous IP infringement 
abatement policy.‖98  But the new coverage limit only applies to infringement existing 
after the endorsement took effect; hence, there are no retroactive increases for ongoing 
litigation. 99  Another typical endorsement provides for licensee coverage, so that the 
insured can sue licensees who, because of a breach, are no longer licensed.100  Other 
                                                             
89 Here, ―markings‖ refer to ―notice [given] to the public that the [article] is patented, either by 
fixing thereon the word ‗patent‘ or the abbreviation ‗pat.,‘ together with the number of the patent, 
or when, from the character of the article, this cannot be done, by fixing to it, or to the package 
wherein one or more of them is contained, a label containing a like notice.‖  35 U.S.C. § 287(a) 
(2006).  This is an important consideration in enforcing patent infringement because if the 
patented article is not marked, then damages may be truncated to the time the infringer received 
notice of lawsuit.  Abatement Policy Specimen, supra note 67, at 9-10. 




94 Id. at 6. 
95 Note that the term ―prevail‖ is analyzed infra Part III.  
96 Abatement Policy Specimen, supra note 67, at 6.  
97 This may be an anomaly in the dates of the policy specimens.  The patent litigation 
insurance policy is from 2005, while the enforcement policy is from 2000.  The settlement 
controls may have been added sometime in between.  
98 Gotham Ins. Co., Endorsement No.: IPI 843-08B (1999) (on file with author).  
99 Id. 
100 Gotham Ins. Co., Endorsement No.: IPI 843-01-A (1999) (on file with author).  
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endorsements include: (1) insurance for patent applications which cover infringements 
that begin while the patent is pending; 101  (2) coverage for foreign patents in their 
respective countries;102 and (3) coverage for reexamination and reissue proceedings.103   
Predictably, the analyzed litigation and enforcement policies have many structural 
similarities, since the same insurer wrote both.  For example, coverage is limited to acts 
occurring during the policy period, and the authorization procedure requires a written 
report with infringement and validity opinions.  There are, however, key differences.  
Chiefly, enforcement insurance is an offensive tool, designed to reimburse costs for a 
lawsuit alleging infringement;  and as an offensive tool, it is subject to abuse by 
speculative litigants.  As a result, IPISC includes an ―Economic Benefit‖ provision, 
which decreases the incentives for profiteering by reducing the insured‘s recovery.  





According to IPISC, ―[o]ne patent, of average risk, at $1 million in limits, is 
approximately $7000 - $9000 annual premium.‖104  But the ―average Abatement policy, 
regardless of limits and number of IP, [costs] about $13,000.‖ 105  However, these are only 
estimates that do not account for the specific risks of the insured or the protected 
technology.  For example, the premium again varies considerably depending on the 
industry covered.106 
 
                                                             
101 Gotham Ins. Co., Endorsement No.: IPI 843-03 (1999) (on file with author). 
102 Gotham Ins. Co., Endorsement No.: IPI 843-04 (1999) (on file with author). 
103 Gotham Ins. Co., Endorsement No.: IPI 843-02 (1999) (on file with author). 
104 Enabling Market Share, supra note 65.  
105 Id. 
106 IPISC, Sample Premiums by Industry, supra note 56; see also IPISC, Claims Scenarios, 
http://www.ipisc.com/iprisk/claims-scenarios/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2008) (noting that the 
―personal fitness industry is one of the most litigious areas of art‖).  





The insurer also factors in the litigiousness of the patent owner during the underwriting 
process.107   
These premiums are also subject to coinsurance and deductible payments.  The 
deductible for enforcement insurance is the same – 2% per claim – as for the defensive 
insurance.  But IPISC requires a minimum of 20% coinsurance.  This is considerably 
higher than the 10% minimum required by the patent litigation insurance.  IPISC 
probably requires a higher coinsurance to deter moral hazards, like speculative litigation.  
Notice that the defensive insurance does not suffer from this moral hazard problem.  
Infringing in reliance of insurance protection would be excluded under the policy108 and 
probably constitutes willful infringement under the objective recklessness standard. 109 
 
   
III. FAILURES OF PATENT INSURANCE 
 
Patent insurance ―has not been successful throughout the world.‖110  There are 
several patent insurance providers, but ―demand has been severely limited by high prices 
. . . .‖ 111  Other prominent problems include the ―poor experiences in the past with 
                                                             
107 See IPISC, Intellectual Property Abatement Insurance Application 6 (2007), available at 
http://www.ipisc.com/downloads/IPISC-Abatement-App.pdf [hereinafter IPISC Application] 
(asking for the applicant‘s average enforcement costs in the past three years).    
108 Defense Policy Specimen, supra note 28, at 15. 
109 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that willful patent 
infringement requires a minimum showing of objective recklessness).   
110 European Study 2003, supra note 17, at 8. 
111 Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 9, at 49. 
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conflict between insured and insurer,‖112 an expensive application, costly claims making 
process, and the ―need for complex and expensive evaluation of risk for insurers.‖113   
 
 
A. Patent Insurance is too Expensive for Businesses 
 
The average cost of offensive patent insurance is $13,000.  From a business 
perspective, insurance looks like an additional maintenance fee for each patent.  
Assuming that a patent is insured from its application onward, the average lifetime fee 
would add up to $260,000.114  Given that the average cost to obtain a patent is $25,000,115 
the first premium adds 52% more to the cost.  So for every two years a company pays its 
patent insurance, it could have paid for another patent.  Essentially, these premiums are 
too expensive for SMEs.116  The same can be said for defensive patent insurance, which 
costs even more per year. 
At least one author has performed a cost-benefit analysis on purchasing patent 
insurance.117  As a framework, Bennett posits a hypothetical inventor, Walter, who must 
decide whether to buy offensive patent insurance.118  Using a decision tree analysis, each 
path of Walter‘s scenario is played out using assumed costs and probabilities. 119  
                                                             
112 European Study 2003, supra note 17, at 8. 
113 Id.   
114 This figure is the average cost of offensive insurance, $13,000, times the lifetime of a 
patent, 20 years. 
115 Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. Small & 
Emerging Bus. L. 137, 138 n.3 (2000) (estimating an average of $25,000 in prosecution costs 
through issuance); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 625, 679 n.44 (2002) 
(―Conservative estimates peg the administrative costs of obtaining an average U.S. patent at 
$20,000.‖). 
116 Assume that American and European patentees have similar price sensitivity to premiums 
as a percentage of obtaining the patents.  In a follow-up study on the feasibility of patent 
insurance in Europe, survey respondents indicated that proposed premiums of €12,240 were too 
high; they further commented that ―the already high patenting and maintaining cost could be 
increased by up to almost 30%.‖  CJA Consultants Ltd, Summary Report of Replies to the Public 
Consultation on the Follow-up Study on Patent Litigation Insurance5 (2007), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/studies/consultation/summary_report_en.
pdf [hereinafter European Study 2007]. 
117 Bennett, supra note 2.   
118 Id. at 404-09.   
119 Id. at 419. 
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Foregoing insurance yields an expected value of $75,000, while purchasing insurance 
achieves an expected value of $63,000.120  The decision tree analysis suggests that Walter 
should not purchase insurance unless he has low risk tolerance.121  Although Bennett‘s 
model is rudimentary, his conclusion only gets stronger with the corrections made later in 
this Note.   
The first correction to Bennett‘s model is that insurers covering Walter‘s widgets 
would not likely authorize litigation against Webster, a hypothetical infringer.  In his 
analysis, Bennett assumes that there is a ―25% probability that legal action w ill be 
necessary against Webster . . . .‖ 122  But the insurer has the right to reject coverage 
because Walter had a ―reason to suspect‖ that a claim would be filed upon obtaining 
insurance. 123  Accordingly, the 25% probability must be replaced with an appropriate 
figure, like the probability that a lawsuit will occur with respect to the average patent.  
According to Lanjouw and Schankerman, only 1% of patents are litigated in United 
States District Courts.124   
Correcting Bennett‘s assumption shows that patent insurance is even more of a 
sunk cost than he predicted.  ―Since the probability of a lawsuit is only 25%, Walter 
stands a 75% chance of losing $15,000.‖ 125  The updated calculus would read: Since the 
general probability of a lawsuit is only 1%, Walter stands a 99% chance of losing 
$15,000.  Thus, Walter‘s expected benefit decreases.  Furthermore, Walter‘s premium is 
four times lower than the average enforcement policy.  Inputting the average $13,000 
policy in the analysis would further decrease Walter‘s expected value.   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Assume: (1) the cost of the insurance is $ 3,000 per year with a coverage limit of $ 500,000; 
(2) litigating the issue is expected to cost $ 500,000; (3) if the suit prevails, the expected damage 
award is $ 1,000,000; (4) litigating the issue is expected to take five years; (5) the plaintiff‘s 
policy stipulates a shared award totaling 125% of the insurer‘s cost on all litigation. Walter‘s 
analysis indicates a 25% probability that legal action will be necessary against Webster and an 
80% probability of winning the suit once filed. Walter will spend $ 15,000 on insurance 
premiums across the five years of litigation (assuming litigation begins this year). The insurance 
company will retain $ 625,000 (the cost of litigation plus 25%) in the event litigation is successful 
but Walter will not be responsible for any litigation costs under the terms of the policy. 
Id. 
120 Id. at 420. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 419. 
123 Abatement Policy Specimen, supra note 67, at 15.  
124 See Jean O. Lanjouw and Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A 
Window on Competition, 32 RAND J. Econ. 129, 131 (2001). 
125 Bennett, supra note 2, at 419 ($15,000 refers to premiums paid over five years of a 
potential litigation).  
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Another branch should be added to Bennett‘s decision tree – the probability and 
cost that the insurer will litigate to deny coverage.  ―[A]n insurer may appear to abide by 
the spirit of a policy, but, as shown in the CGL litigation described above, that same 
insurer will litigate to deny coverage if that course appears more profitable than paying 
claims.‖126  Unfortunately, statistics are not as readily available because some policies, 
like IPISC‘s, rely on binding arbitration. 127  If there is a dispute, ―the cost of Arbitration 
shall be shared equally between the Named Insured and the Company including filing 
fees, costs, and Arbitrator‘s charges.‖128  But, as revealed in Plug-in Storage System v. 
Homestead Insurance Co., determining whether and how arbitration applies can be 
another source of litigation.129  Moreover, the probability that an insured will have to 
litigate against the insurer depends on the clarity of the terms in the policy.  
IPISC‘s policies ―contain terms that are sufficiently ambiguous to litigate at 
length in court or arbitration.‖130  One such term is ―prevail.‖  Both the defensive and 
offensive policies contain some sort of authorization appeals provision: 
 
Authorization to appeal is required to be obtained by Named 
Insured if the Named Insured does not prevail in the Covered Litigation 
and wishes to appeal the decision.  However, authorization is not required 
to be obtained again by the Named Insured if the Named Insured is the 
prevailing party in the Covered Litigation and the opposing party appeals 
such decision.131 
 
―Prevail‖ is not defined in the policy.  According to Merriam-Webster‘s 
Dictionary of Law, prevail means ―to obtain substantially the relief or action sought in a 
                                                             
126 Reyes, supra note 8, ¶ 32; see also Amerisure Ins. Co. v. Laserage Tech. Corp., 2 F. Supp. 
2d 296 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (granting summary judgment for insurers when the insureds failed to 
give timely notice of the lawsuit); Homedics, Inc. v. Cigna Fire Underwriters Ins. Co., No. SA 
CV 99-1352 DOC (Anx), No. SA CV 99-0928 DOC (Anx), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8927 (D. Cal. 
2000) (granting coverage for insured‘s attorneys‘ fees arising from patent infringement lawsuit);.  
127 Defense Policy Specimen, supra note 28, at 16-17.   
128 Id. at 17. 
129 Plug-In Storage Sys. v. Homestead Ins. Co., 81 F. Supp. 2d 371 (D. Conn. 1999) (deciding 
whether tort statute of limitations precluded patent insurer from demanding arbitration).  
130 Reyes, supra note 8, ¶ 32. 
131 Defense Policy Specimen, supra note 28, at 5 (emphasis added).  Although the defensive 
policy is cited, the offensive policy has substantially similar language.  Abatement Policy 
Specimen, supra note 67, at 6. 
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lawsuit‖.132  Alternatively, we could analogize to the law of costs: ―[T]o be a ‗prevailing 
party,‘ for the purposes of awarding costs, a party must obtain at least some relief on the 
merits of the party‘s claim or claims.‖ 133  Given these definitions, it appears that counsel 
for both sides can argue their case.   
And what about interlocutory appeals — Is there a ―prevailing party‖ before final 
judgment has been entered?  Does the insured need authorization to appeal a claim 
construction after a Markman hearing?  These debatable questions are ripe for litigation 
between the insurers and the insureds.  Furthermore, the appeals provision does not 
address a situation where the Named Insured is the prevailing party but wishes to appeal 
the decision anyway.  This could arise if the trial court grants judgment in favor of the  
insured, but the insured believes that damages were erroneously assessed.  
In addition to litigation against the insurer, the application costs are missing from 
Bennett‘s analysis.  Patent insurance applicants must obtain an infringement opinion.134  
The cost of an opinion depends on many factors, like the applicant‘s industry.  In 1998, 
an infringement opinion cost at least $10,000 if the patent had any ―real complexity,‖ 
while ―an opinion on a set of submarine patents [] cost well over $ 100,000.‖ 135  But 
typically, obtaining an infringement opinion from a large New York law firm costs about 
$30,000.136  Thus, Walter needs to consider the $30,000 fixed cost attached to purchasing 
insurance.   
The studied policies have several hidden costs, which add penalties to certain 
paths in Bennett‘s decision tree model.  For example, an expense is hidden in the claims 
making process.  Recall that under both defensive and offensive policies, the insured 
must present an infringement opinion whenever the Named Insured submits a claim to 
IPISC.137  Stated differently, deciding to sue is not free.  As a result, Walter‘s expected 
value for filing a lawsuit decreases by $30,000.  Specific to the enforcement insurance, 
                                                             
132 Merriam-Webster‘s Dictionary of Law, Prevail, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/prevail (last visited Apr. 13, 2008) (emphasis added).  
133 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs § 13 (emphasis added); see also Beraha v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 870 F. 
Supp. 1085 (N.D. Ga. 1994), aff’d, 64 F.3d 678 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (awarding costs to prevailing 
party defendants in a patent infringement action where the accused devices did not lit erally 
infringe, but did infringe under the doctrine of equivalents).  
134 IPISC Application, supra note 107, at 1.  
135 Edwin H. Taylor & Glenn E. Von Tersch, A Proposal to Shore Up the Foundations of 
Patent Law that the Underwater Line Eroded, 20 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 721, 740 (1998). 
136 Interview with Henry Lebowitz, Partner, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, in 
New York, N.Y. (Apr. 11, 2008). 
137 Abatement Policy Specimen, supra note 66, at 9-10; Defense Policy Specimen, supra note 
28, at 13. 
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another hidden cost lies in the ―Economic Benefit‖ provision.  Recall that an insured may 
have to pay a bonus to IPISC should the court issue an injunction-like remedy.138   
 
 
B. Patent Insurance is too Risky for Insurers 
 
Premiums are expensive because it is difficult to calculate an insured‘s risk 
profile.  Because the insurance is voluntary, no applicant would pay to protect useless 
patents.  Only valuable, contestable patents are worth protecting.  While the risk of 
litigation for the ―average‖ patent may be 1%, insurers fear that their customers make up 
sizeable portion of that 1%.  This is known as the adverse selection problem. 
To screen out these bad risks, the insurers engage in a ―complex and expensive 
technical risk assessment,‖ known as underwriting. 139  This process takes into account 
various factors, like the insured‘s litigiousness and industry.140  While these risk variables 
may be quantified, others cannot.   
Underwriting is premised on a snapshot of the law at the time that the insured was 
approved.  Thus, the changing patent laws create additional risk.  To illustrate, recall that 
the enforcement insurance uses an ―Economic Benefit‖ provision to recover the litigation 
expense; and if an injunction is ordered, IPISC recovers 1.25 times the litigation 
expense. 141  When insured patentees secured injunctions easily, IPISC recovered a 
substantial portion of its operating expense.  Then eBay v. MercExchange142 was decided, 
making it more difficult for a patentee to obtain an injunction as a matter of course.  
Consequently, previous risk calculations were probably leading to underperforming 
rewards.143  Insurers can contain the problem of changing laws by using yearly contracts.  
                                                             
138 Abatement Policy Specimen, supra note 67, at 13. 
139 European Study 2006, supra note 17, at 9. 
140 See IPISC Application, supra note 107, at 6 (insurance application requires applicant to 
disclose patent litigation costs of the past 3 years); Benjamin Hershkowitz, What Are My 
Chances? From Idea Through Litigation, Kenyon & Kenyon (2003) available at 
http://library.findlaw.com/2003/Oct/16/133092.html (noting that the incidence of patent litigation 
per industry varies, from 0.16% for chemical patents to greater than 25% for the ―most ‗valuable‘ 
drugs and health patents‖).  
141 Abatement Policy Specimen, supra note 67, at 12. 
142 eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2007).  
143 Alternatively, the changing laws could work in the insurer‘s favor.  In KSR International v. 
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), the Supreme Court held that the Teaching-Suggestion-
Motivation test was not the only way to prove obviousness; thus, making it easier to invalidate 
patents.  Consequently, insurers could expect for lawsuits to win or lose sooner, which lowers 
litigation costs.  Rachel Krevans, Comments on KSR Supreme Court Ruling, IP Frontline, Apr. 
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Each time the law changes, so does the policy.  But this solution increases transaction 
costs, which are passed on to customers.  This could lead to decreased market share if the 
customers are price-sensitive.  
To summarize the failures described above: the premiums are too expensive for 
the businesses, and the risk is too high for the insurers.  Worse yet, the insurers cannot 
reduce the price of the insurance until there are enough businesses to spread the risk.  
 
 
IV. TOWARDS MANDATORY PATENT INSURANCE 
 
The patent insurance industry suffers from negative network externalities. In other 
words, ―there may be a ‗chicken and egg‘ problem in which no one makes the initial 
investments necessary to induce everyone else to join the network, and the [product] 
remains unexploited.‖144  Patent insurers are not willing to lower premiums until more 
insureds join the risk pool.  But insureds will not join until the premiums are lowered.  So 
which comes first - the insurer or the insured? 
Both should come at the same time, according to CJA Consultants. 145   A 
mandatory patent insurance scheme would enlarge the customer base so that insurers 
could lower premiums to an attractive amount.146  Concluding that such a scheme was 
feasible, CJA Consultants proposed a mandatory patent insurance scheme to the 
European Commission in June 2006.147  This Note considers that mandatory insurance 
scheme, and whether it is adaptable to the U.S. market.   
 
 
A. The Scheme 
 
CJA Consultants proposed sixteen options.  All of these options cover only 
European Patents, which are those granted under the European Patent Convention Article 
2(1).148   Simply put, European Patents are a bundle of nationally-enforceable, nationally-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
30, 2007, http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=14923&deptid=7 (commenting that 
KSR ―will make it easier to obtain summary judgment that a patent is obvious‖). 
144 Dennis W. Carlton & Alan S. Frankel, Transaction Costs, Externalities, and "Two-Sided" 
Payment Markets, Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 617, 623 (2005)..  
145 European Study 2006, supra note 17, at 16. 
146 Id. at 37. 
147 Id. at 16. 
148 European Patent Convention [hereinafter EPC] Art. 2(1) (2000) (―Patents granted under 
this Convention shall be called European patents.‖).  
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revocable patents.149  Further, each option consists of varying features, like whether an 
insurer should cover damages.  This Note focuses on Option 1 (―the Scheme‖), which 
contains all of the features identified by CJA Consultants.  
The Scheme calls for the implementation of mandatory insurance by European 
Union-wide legislation via EU Regulations. 150   Currently, a European patentee will 
prosecute their patent at the European Patent Office (―EPO‖); and after the EPO grants a 
patent, the European patentee must validate the patent in each of the EU Member States 
where he desires protection.151  The mandatory scheme takes advantage of this process by 
requiring European patentees to show a certificate of insurance to the member state‘s 
patent office where it wishes to obtain validation of its European patent. 152  If the patentee 
does not have the certificate, then the patent cannot be validated or renewed; the patent 
will not be in force in that member state.153 
The Scheme proposes the following insurance product.  A European patentee 
would purchase insurance from an approved insurer, like Lloyd‘s of London. 154  The 
policy would cover expenses related to suing infringers in the member state for which 
insurance was purchased.  Due to dramatic variances in the number of litigations filed 
and settlements accomplished among countries, the Scheme requires European patentees 
to choose where they want coverage. 
                                                             
149 EPC Art. 2(2) (2000); David Hunt, et al., Patent Searching: Tools & Techniques 76 (Wiley 
2007); Carl A. Nelson, Import/Export: How to Take Your Business Across Borders 60 (McGraw 
Hill Professional, 3d ed. 2000). 
150 European Study 2006, supra note 17, at 47. 
151 European Patent Office, How to apply for a European patent, 
http://www.epo.org/patents/One-Stop-Page.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2009). Depending on the 
jurisdiction, validation consists of paying fees and filing translations of the specification.   
152 European Study 2006, supra note 17, at 47. 
153 Id. 
154 Lloyd‘s is the only insurer that demonstrated interest in providing insurance for the 
mandatory scheme. Id. at 56. 















Figure 1 – The chart displays indicative annual premiums for a few countries, 
assuming €500,000 in coverage.155 
 
For example, a European patentee may decide to purchase insurance for only the 
United Kingdom, Germany, and Austria.  In addition to offensive coverage, the Scheme 
covers costs incurred in defending against allegations of infringement.  However, the 
scope of defense would be limited to cover only products or processes related to the 
insured patent. 156   As for the geographic scope, the defensive insurance covers the 
European patentee in any EU member state.  Moreover, the i nsurance would impose a 
coverage limit, deductible, and co-insurance payment – all of which are negotiable.157 
To achieve the premiums displayed above, CJA Consultants stress that the 
Scheme must forego ―the expense and time consuming consequences of a technical risk 
assessment at the time of taking out the insurance contract.‖ 158   The ―technical risk 
assessment‖ is the same as IPISC‘s requirement for an ―infringement opinion,‖ described 
above.  Essentially, the Scheme requires insurers to cover European patentees while 
postponing calculating the patent‘s risk profile ―until a specific risk . . . is known.‖ 159  But 
the insurer may use a non-technical risk assessment—such as the company‘s size and 
commercial field—to calculate the premium.160   
                                                             
155 Id. at 72. 
156 Id. at 43. 
157 Id. at 51, 62. 
158 Id. at 37 (emphasis omitted). 
159 Id. at 40. 
160 Id. at 41. 
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Nonetheless, infringement opinions are still necessary.  When a European 
patentee wants to submit a claim for offensive coverage, he must order a technical risk 
assessment of his patent.  The insurer must cover the costs so long as the European 
patentee has a 51% or better chance of success. 161   But CJA Consultants note that 
patentees cannot be so restrained by the technical risk assessment.  A patentee must have 
the ―right to fight‖ because ―only the threat of injunction and damages awarded by a 
court can maintain the value of pa tents in general.‖ 162   Accordingly, if a European 
patentee insists on proceeding with litigation despite worse than 51% odds, then he must 
bear the costs.163  But if the patentee sues and wins despite the insurer‘s refusal to cover 
costs, then the insurer must pay the costs as if the technical risk assessment had 
concluded that there was a 51% chance of winning. 164 
Finally, the Scheme contemplates some exemptions.  For example, insurers ―may 
exclude a class of patentees which they consider to be inappropriate, . . .  on the grounds 
that their patent litigation activities are globally oriented and they operate under their own 
globally oriented patent litigation budgets . . . .‖ 165   According to CJA Consultants, 
globally oriented companies do not want to be covered in the European market—
―[l]itigation in their case is a budgeted loss not a risk . . . .‖ 166  Interestingly, insurers do 
not want to cover globally oriented companies because the insurers tend to have little 
influence over the companies‘ global litigation strategies. 167   In addition to globally 
oriented companies, ―[p]atentees can seek exemption on the ground that they can 
demonstrate their own significant patent litigation spend [sic] and thus have no external 
risk to cover . . . .‖168   
 
 
B. Obstacles and the U.S. Market 
 
To recap, the failures of the patent insurance industry are high premiums, 
expensive applications, pricey claims making process, costly underwriting, and conflict 
between insurers and insureds.   
                                                             
161 Id. at 44. 
162 Id. 
163 Id.   
164 Id. at 45. 
165 Id. at 60. 
166 Id. at 58. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 60. 
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The Scheme apparently solves two of these problems.  For example, insuring a 
patent for €500,000 in coverage in the most expensive member state, Germany, is 
predicted to cost less than €2,500 per annum—and this includes both offensive and 
defensive coverage related to the patent.  Compare that to IPISC‘s annual averages of 
$30,000 for defensive litigation insurance plus $13,000 for offensive litigation insurance 
in the U.S.  Second, applications are cheaper if insurers drop the initial technical risk 
assessment.  But, ultimately, the Scheme does not resolve the pricey claims making 
process, costly underwriting, and conflict between insurers and insureds.  
In addition to overcoming the general failures of the patent insurance industry, the 
Scheme, or some U.S.-variant, would have to surmount other obstacles specific to its 
features.  For example, the Scheme requires policing mechanisms to check a patentee‘s 
certificate of insurance upon issuing a patent or paying its maintenance fees.  A U.S. 
version of the Scheme would add an additional administrative burden to the already 
overworked USPTO.169 
Because some businesses will not want to pay the mandatory insurance, and 
because the premiums are negotiable, some businesses might effectively evade the 
insurance by opting for 99% coinsurance and a high deductible.  To counter ―virtual 
evasion,‖ the Scheme proposes minimum standards for the coverage limit, deductible, 
and coinsurance.170  The lowest coverage limit proposed by the Scheme was €100,000 per 
year.171  This can result in over-insuring some SMEs, which is an unnecessary financial 
burden because they are paying for more risk than they are exposed to.  Further, the 
Scheme does not propose workable criteria for determining the minimums.  
Another problem is that the Scheme increases initial costs for start-up companies 
that use patents.  CJA Consultants found that premiums for a modified version of the 
Scheme (i.e., excluding damages and limiting coverage to €250,000) would account for a 
22.5% increase in total costs for obtaining and maintaining a European patent validated in 
all countries for a period of ten years. 172   But this figure merits skepticism.  CJA 
Consultants only accounted for six years of annual premiums in obtaining a figure that is 
supposed to span ten years.173  Recalculating their study to include ten years of annual 
premiums shows that the premiums are 37.5% of total patenting costs. 174 
                                                             
169Ashley Chuang, Fixing the Failures of Software Patent Protection: Deterring Patent 
Trolling by Applying Industry-Specific Patentability Standards, 16 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 215, 
227-28 (2006) (―The USPTO is busy, under-funded, and under-staffed.‖).   
170 European Study 2006, supra note 17, at 51. 
171 Id. at 70-74. 
172 Id. at 79.  See the last row of Table 14, which calculates the premiums as a percentage of 
total costs ten years from application.  
173 Id.  Table 14 is populated using data from Table 9, ―Indicative premiums by country for 
Option 2.‖  Id. at 78.  In Table 14, the total premium for ―all countries‖ is €17,640.  The sum of 
17,640 is obtained by adding the individual premiums for each country listed.  Id. (see the 
penultimate column, titled ―Premiums €‖).  The problem with the figure is that the total premium 
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Thus, while the Scheme may propose to help SMEs, it may be hindering a new 
generation of innovators.  But assuming a start-up can establish a beachhead, perhaps the 
benefits outweigh the costs.  According to Llobet and Suarez, who mathematically 
studied the value of enforcement insurance across different legal-cost allocation rules, it 
is always optimal for a patentee to undertake some patent enforcement insurance. 175  
Indeed, in comparing the UK to the U.S., Llobet and Suarez found that ―the benefits of 
patent litigation insurance are clearly greater in the US system when monopoly profits are 
relatively small and litigation costs are large.‖176   
Another barrier to adopting the Scheme in the United States is its potential for 
increasing litigation.  Already the United States is criticized for generating excessive 
patent litigation,177 and the Scheme can only exacerbate that problem.  CJA Consultants 
recognize as much with respect to the EU, 178 stating ―the aggregate costs of an increased 
number of proceedings would probably rise.‖179 
Both of the aforementioned concerns—that the Scheme would stymie SMEs and 
increase litigation—were raised by the American Chamber of Commerce to the European 
Union (―AmCham EU‖), an organization in Europe representing the views of companies 
of American nationality.  In response to CJA Consultants‘ 2006 study, AmCham EU 
stated: 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
listed for each country is only six years worth of annual premiums according to Table 9.  No 
explanation is given as to why only six years of annual premiums, rather than ten years, are used.  
Further, ―all countries‖ only represents those included in Table 14 (Germany, UK, France, 
Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, Austria, and Sweden).  Notably, the following countries are 
missing: Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, and Poland.  
174 According to Table 14, six years of premiums for ―all countries‖ would cost €17,640 
(€2,940 per year).  Multiplying this by ten years equals €29,400.  Table 14 states that the total 
costs for obtaining and maintaining a European patent in ―all countries‖ equals €78,472.  Thus, 
premiums account for 37.5% of the total costs (i.e.,  €29,400 divided by €78,472) over a ten year 
period. See id. 
175 Gerard Llobet & Javier Suarez, Patent Litigation and the Role of Enforcement Insurance 2-
3 (July 2008), available at http://www.cemfi.es/~suarez/llobet-suarez.pdf (unpublished 
manuscript).  
176 Id. at 5. ―When monopoly profits are small,‖ effectively refers to SMEs. 
177 Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 2795, the “Patent Act of 2005”: Hearing 
on H.R. 2795 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 7, 47 (2005) (statement of Emery Simon, Counsel, The 
Business Software Alliance) (―[T]he problem of excessive litigation continues to spiral out of 
control in our industry.‖); Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral 
Economics for the Common Good, 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 141 (2008). 
178 European Study 2006, supra note 17, at 9 (recognizing that wider use of patent litigation 
insurance would ―increase the amount of litigation‖). 
179 Id. at 9. 




[We have] serious concerns regarding proposals for a mandatory 
patent litigation insurance scheme. Such a scheme would further increase 
the cost of obtaining patent protection in the European Union, particularly 
for small and medium size enterprises which already often hesitate to file 
for protection of their patentable inventions because of expensive patent 
application, translation, prosecution and maintenance fees.  Moreover, 
such a scheme raises the risk of expensive and disruptive patent litigation 
practices in Europe such as those already common in the United States. 180   
 
Specifically, AmCham EU points out that patent litigation insurance may have the 
―unintended side effect‖ of fomenting patent trolls because insurers may prefer a quick 
settlement instead of litigating.181 
Indeed, the Scheme is ―designed to lead to quicker and fairer settlements, 
including more licensing in appropriate cases, and out-of-court settlements.‖ 182  Hence, 
as AmCham EU noted, insurers will likely undermine a patentee‘s commitment to litigate 
by pressuring settlement.  Consequently, an opponent may benefit by reducing the 
probability that a patentee will hold out for better settlement terms or a better litigation 
outcome, like an injunction. 183   On the other hand, Llobet and Suarez urge—with a 
mathematical model as evidence—that a patentee with enforcement insurance is more 
likely to achieve better settlements due to their commitment to incur litigation costs.184   
Given the identified problems, what are the stakeholders‘ appetites for mandatory 
patent insurance?  In a follow-up study, CJA Consultants summarize twenty-eight 
responses to the Scheme: ―The overall stakeholders‘ reaction to the study‘s conclusions is 
negative.  All the responses to the consultation oppose the introduction of the insurance 
                                                             
180 Press Release, American Chamber of Commerce to the EU, AmCham EU Comments on 
the June 2006 Study Undertaken by CJA Consultants Ltd. On ‗Patent Litigation Insurance: A 
Study for the European Commission on the Feasibility of Possible Insurance Schemes on Patent 
Litigation Risks,‘ (Feb. 2, 2007), available at 
http://www.eucommittee.be/Pops/2007/IP_PatentLitigationInsurance_02022007.pdf.  
181 Id. 
182 European Study 2006, supra note 17, at 9. 
183 Press Release, Trademarks, Patents & Designs Federation, Comment to European 
Commission re patent litigation insurance, 2-3 (Dec. 2006), available at 
http://www.tmpdf.net/cms/images/newsimages/06_PP022 
%20Patent%20litigation%20insurance%20to%20Commission.pdf [hereinafter TMPDF 
Comment]. 
184 Llobet and Suarez, supra at note 175, at 25. 
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schemes . . . .‖185  In addition to the identified problems, the follow-up study summarizes 
three more issues raised by stakeholders. 
First, the proposed premiums are too expensive.  Insuring a single patent in the 
United Kingdom, Germany, and Austria for the highest level of coverage (€500,000) 
would cost €3,506 per year.186  Although this amount is remarkably less than IPISC‘s 
average premiums, a similarly priced mandatory insurance program would likely face 
substantial opposition form SMEs in the United States.  Ideally, patent insurance would 
cost about the same as commercial general liability insurance, which has a proven 
market.  According to Intellisurance, 187  ―agents can provide Commercial General 
Liability (CGL) coverage to most industries at a rate as low as $350 a year.‖ 188  
Moreover, the indicative premiums are based on EU litigation statistics, where there is 
much less litigation than in the United States.  Hence, it is reasonable to assume that a 
U.S. Scheme would cost more per year.   
Second, the indicative premiums assume, incorrectly, that insurers will forego a 
technical risk assessment when a patentee applies for insurance.  Recall that the principal 
method of reducing costs associated with patent litigation insurance is to omit the 
technical risk assessment from the application process.  Yet the European Insurance 
Committee (―CEA‖) and the International Association of Legal Expenses Insurance 
(―RIAD‖) have flatly rejected that possibility: ―Waiving an individual risk assessment is 
contrary to fundamental rules of the insurance business and cannot be accepted by 
insurers.‖189  The CEA further opined that ―to make sure that high risks can be covered by 
the flat premium, this premium will have to be substantially higher than an average 
premium based on an individual risk assessment.‖ 190  Likewise, U.S. patent insurers, like 
IPISC, would not omit the infringement opinion from the application process. 
                                                             
185 European Study 2007, supra at note 116, at 4. The respondents included insurers, national 
patent offices, industry associations, a company, patent attorneys, and individuals.   
186 See European Study 2006, supra note 17, at 72 tb1.8. 
187 Intellisurance is a full-service online insurance brokerage offering both personal and 
commercial insurance.  See generally Intellisurance Insurance Brokerage, About Us, 
http://www.intellisuranceusa.com/index.php?p=about-us (last visited May 9, 2009). 
188 Intellisurance, Commercial General Liability, 
http://www.intellisuranceusa.com/index.php?p=package-commercial-general-liability (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2009). 
189 CEA, CEA Position Paper on Feasibility Study on a Patent Litigation Insurance 2 (2006), 
http://www.cea.eu/uploads/DocumentsLibrary/documents/position306.pdf [hereinafter CEA 
Position Paper]; RIAD, Joint Position Paper of CEA and RIAD on the Final Study on the 
Feasibility of Possible Insurance Schemes against Patent Litigation Risks (2006), 
http://www.riad-online.net/61.0.html. 
190 CEA Position Paper, supra note 189, at 2. 
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Third, the Scheme contemplates that the insurer, not the insured, may make 
strategic decisions. In some circumstances, this may implicate the insured‘s choice of 
litigation counsel or infringement opinion counsel.  191  Still worse, under the Scheme the 
insurer can take direct control of the litigation.192  Because ―[l]itigation management is 
vital to any potential litigant,‖ 193  such limitations practically render the Scheme 
ineffective.  This concern is universal and would apply equally to a U.S. version of the 
Scheme.194  
On the whole, the Scheme is a detailed attempt at solving some of the failures of 
the patent insurance industry, such as stratospheric premiums and expensive applications.  
However, the Scheme does not address important issues, like pricey claims making 
process, costly underwriting, and conflict between insurers and insureds.  To be sure, the 
Scheme seems to create more problems than it solves.  A U.S. version of the Scheme 
would fail as a result.  Notwithstanding, further research, like that of Llobet and Suarez, 
is necessary to provide empirical support for the European Commissions‘ intuitions on a 





As the United States becomes an information economy, the value of patents will 
become increasingly important.  At bottom, patents grant exclusionary rights, which 
require resources to pursue infringers.  Recent statistics show that this can cost as much 
$5,000,000.  Moreover, patentees are not the only entities subject to expensive litigation 
risks, for businesses in general may infringe patents.  Not surprisingly, venturing 
underwriters developed two types of insurance to address these problems.  
Patent litigation insurance covers the litigation expenses incurred while defending 
an allegation of patent infringement.  The defensive policy contains several important 
limitations, like veto power over the selection of counsel, budget, settlement, and appeals.  
Logically, the defensive policy excludes coverage for certain circumstances, like willful 
infringement.  Typical coverage ranges from $100,000 to $5,000,000.  On average, the 
annual premium for this insurance is about $30,000.  Patent enforcement insurance, on 
the other hand, reimburses the litigation expenses arising from a lawsuit against an 
alleged infringer.  The same insurer wrote both policies, so they were largely the same.  
But the offensive policy diverges in some important ways, like using recovery sharing to 
                                                             
191 European Study 2006, supra note 17, at 51-52. 
192 Id. at 52 (―It is normal for the practitioner to have a limited costs authority whereby when 
costs reach a certain level (for instance €10,000) the underwriter or their representatives will take 
direct control of the conduct of the case.‖). 
193 TMPDF Comment, supra note 183, at 2-3. 
194 See id., at 2-3, 5 (strongly opposing insurers control of litigation and listing TMPDF 
members, like U.S. businesses Xerox, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, and Microsoft).  
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recoup litigation expenses.  An average offensive policy costs $13,000 per year.  
Although patent insurance has been offered for the last fifteen years, the demand 
remains severely limited.195  It is not difficult to see why.  As described in Part III, patent 
insurance is too expensive for businesses and too risky for insurers. 
It is important to address the problems facing patent insurance.  Over time, SMEs‘ 
inability to enforce patents due to expensive litigation could lower incentives to 
innovate.196  Patent insurance can provide the resources SMEs need to enforce their patent 
rights. 197   Furthermore, a restored confidence in the patent system leads to more 
patenting, which enriches the national knowledge base.  For this reason, Gørtz and 
Konnerup conclude that ―a legal expense insurance programme increases the value of 
patents.‖198   But a ―certain level of public involvement will probably be required during a 
start-up phase if it is to attain sufficient volume and critical mass . . . .‖199   
To that end, this Note analyzed CJA Consultants‘ mandatory patent insurance 
scheme for the European Union.  Their study concluded that only a compulsory program 
can produce the critical mass required to lower the premiums.  A mandatory scheme 
would also address other shortcomings of the policies, like the expensive claims process 
and costly applications.  But on the whole, a mandatory program faces significant 
challenges.  Part IV questioned whether such a program could be adapted in the United 
States.  For now, the answer is a resounding no. 
But statistical studies similar to those conducted in Europe are necessary to 
analyze the feasibility of a mandatory patent insurance program in the United States.  
Ideally, such studies would detail a functional program which both avoids the identified 
pitfalls in the IPISC policy specimens and proves the statistical feasibility of sub-$1000 
premiums. 
 
                                                             
195 Id. at 4. 
196 Ronspies, supra note 10, at 211.  
197 Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 9, at 49, 68-69. 
198 Gørtz & Konnerup, supra note 12, at 5. 
199 Id. at 6.   
